Recent Developments: Mitchell v. Maryland Casualty Co.: For the Purposes of Asbestos-Related Diseases under a General Liability Insurance Policy,  Bodily Injury  Occurs When the Victim Is Initially Exposed to the Hazardous Condition by Goldsmith, Kenneth J.
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 22
Number 2 Fall, 1991 Article 6
1991
Recent Developments: Mitchell v. Maryland
Casualty Co.: For the Purposes of Asbestos-Related
Diseases under a General Liability Insurance Policy,
"Bodily Injury" Occurs When the Victim Is Initially
Exposed to the Hazardous Condition
Kenneth J. Goldsmith
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Goldsmith, Kenneth J. (1991) "Recent Developments: Mitchell v. Maryland Casualty Co.: For the Purposes of Asbestos-Related
Diseases under a General Liability Insurance Policy, "Bodily Injury" Occurs When the Victim Is Initially Exposed to the Hazardous
Condition," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 22 : No. 2 , Article 6.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol22/iss2/6
of the forgery. ld. The court held that 
the evidence of both the forged signa-
ture on the agreement and Optic's 
awareness of the forgery on March 13, 
1990, may have carried the requisite 
weight for the trial court to find that 
Optic continued the suit in bad faith. 
The court remanded the case with the 
view that the fees and expenses from 
the misappropriation claim may be 
severable from those associated with 
the breach of contract claim, depend-
ing on what the trial court finds on 
remand. ld. at 590. 
The decision of the court of spe-
cial appeals in Optic Graphics offers 
the Maryland legal community some 
insight as to the direction lower courts 
may take in deciding disputes under 
the Maryland Uniform Trade Secret 
Act. While courts must regard the 
Restatement of Torts as a guide in 
defining terms within the Act, they 
shall look specifically to the Act for 
settling such disputes. Furthermore, 
the Maryland legal community can 
expect courts to look to general provi-
sions under Maryland Rules ofProce-
dure and Maryland case law when 
sanctioning parties who bring bad 
faith trade secret misappropriation 
claims under the Maryland Uniform 
Trade Secret Act. As for the ambi-
tious employees who decide to branch 
off on their own from the powerful, 
more established employer, the court 
of special appeals has interpreted the 
Act to fully protect those daring souls 
and their former employers who act in 
good faith. 
- Michael E. Muldowney 
Mitchell v. Maryland Casualty Co.: 
FOR THE PURPOSES OF ASBES-
TOS-RELATED DISEASES UN-
DER A GENERAL LIABILITY IN-
SURANCE POLICY, "BODILY 
INJURY" OCCURS WHEN THE 
VICTIM IS INITIALLY EXPOSED 
TO THE HAZARDOUS CONDI-
TION. 
In Mitchell v. Maryland Casualty 
Co., 595 A.2d 469 (Md. 1991), the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
that, for the purposes of insurance The exposure, in his opinion, is the 
claims involving asbestos, "bodily direct cause of the diseases and, there-
injury" occurs when asbestos fibers fore, inhalation constitutes the point 
are inhaled and retained in the lungs, of" bodily injury." Mitchell, 595 
even if no diagnosable disease has A.2d at 471. 
manifested itself. If the period of Maryland Casualty disagreed with 
coverage has expired under a general Mitchell. It believed that because 
liability insurance policy for an in- Mitchell's policy coverage had lapsed, 
staller of asbestos products, claims for all asbestos-related disease claims 
diseases which are caused by exposure against Mitchell were no longer cov-
to asbestos fibers during the policy ered by Maryland Casualty. It felt that 
coverage will be defended by the in- unless the disease has manifested itself 
demnifier as if the resulting disease during the policy coverage, there was 
had manifested itself during the period no obligation to defend or indemnify. 
of coverage. In support, Maryland Casualty intro-
Until 1976, Lloyd E. Mitchell was duced the affidavit of Dr. Paul Epstein, 
involved in the sale, distribution and a clinician, which stated that exposure 
installation of products which con- to asbestos does not always result in 
tained asbestos. During the period of disease and that several events must 
1965 to at least January 1, 1977, occur in conjunction with asbestos 
Mitchell was covered by a general exposure before it can progress to 
liability insurance policy from Mary- bodily injury. Therefore, in his opin-
land Casualty Company.· The policy ion, diagnOSis of the disease would be 
required that Maryland Casualty de- the proper point at which to measure 
fend and indemnify Mitchell from all " bodily injury." ld. 
claims resulting from asbestos-related Both parties filed for declaratory 
bodily injuries which occurred during judgment in the Circuit Court for 
the insurance policy period. The HarfordCounty. Afterthecomplaints 
policy defined" occurrence" as "an were filed, each party also moved for 
accident, including continuous or re- summary judgment claiming that no 
peated exposure to conditions, which material facts were in dispute. The 
results in bodily injury ... neither trial court ruled in favor of Maryland 
expected nor intended from the stand- Casualty's motion, finding that the 
point of the insured." The policy point of" bodily injury," for the pur-
additionally defined "bodily injury" poses of insurance coverage, should 
as " bodily injury, sickness, or disease be measured by the point of manifes-
sustained by any person which occurs tation of the asbestos-related disease. 
during the policy period." Mitchell appealed, and the Court of 
After his insurance coverage had Appeals of Maryland granted certio-
lapsed, Mitchell was sued by several rari before consideration by the court 
individuals who had been exposed to of special appeals. 
asbestos in his products. He sought to The appellate court considered two 
have Maryland Casualty defend against issues. The first issue was whether, 
the claims, arguing that, because the under a comprehensive generalliabil-
people were injured from products ity insurance policy, coverage is trig-
installed during the period of cover- geredatthepointofinitial exposure or 
age, he should be defended and indem- when an asbestos-related disease first 
nified from those claims. In support manifests itself to a clinically detect-
of this contention, Mitchell introduced able degree. Second, the court con-
the affidavit of Dr. John Craighead, a sidered whether the circuit court erred 
physician and pathologist. It stated in adopting the " manifestation" theory 
that asbestos fibers injure the lungs infmdingforMarylandCasualtywhen, 
upon inhalation, and the resulting in- pathologically, damage to the body 
jury leads to a variety oflung diseases. from asbestos could occur upon expo-
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sure. Id. at 472. 
Chief Judge Murphy wrote the 
opinion for the court of appeals. In 
deciding the first issue, the court first 
gathered a working background in the 
plain meaning of the term "bodily 
injury" as written in the policy de-
scription. It acknowledged that with-
out a finding of" bodily injury," cov-
erage would not be triggered. The 
court found that" [w]hile the defini-
tion of bodily injury includes sickness 
and disease . . . the definition also 
specifically includes injury to the body 
.... " Mitchell, 595 A.2d at 475-76 
(quoting Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. 
Forty-Eight Insulations, 451 F .Supp. 
1230, 1242 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff'd, 
633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980) (em-
phasis in original». The court also 
found authority that most jurisdictions 
have defined "bodily injury" to in-
clude any " localized abnormal condi-
tion." Mitchell, 595 A.2d at 476. The 
court also looked to Black's Law Dic-
tionary 159 (5th ed. 1979), which 
stated that "bodily injury . . . 
[g]enerally refers only to injury to the 
body, or to ... diseases contracted by 
the injured as a result of injury." Id. 
These findings illustrated that because 
a distinction existed between the oc-
currence of " bodily injury" and the 
resulting manifestation of sickness or 
disease, the terminology" sickness or 
disease" did not determine when an 
injury took place, but only that some 
injury did exist. Id. The question of 
"when" was an issue for medical 
experts. 
Consequently, the court of ap-
peals next looked to the affidavits of 
the medical experts, Craighead and 
Epstein. Id. The court noted that they 
were in general agreement as to their 
findings, except as to the initial inci-
dence of "bodily injury." Id. The 
court took an interest in the particular 
field of each expert, just as the Su-
preme Court of Illinois did in Zurich 
Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus., 514 
N.E.2d 150 (Ill. 1987). 
The court recognized that the is-
sue presented in Zurich was identical 
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to the one presented before the court in 
Mitchell. Mitchell, 595 A.2d at 476. 
Nine physicians testified extensively, 
and there was disagreement between 
the pathologists and the clinicians as 
to when an injury occurred in asbestos 
cases. The clinicians conceded that 
damage might occur upon inhalation, 
but they also noted that the lung is 
capable of repairing itself so that not 
every inhalation precipitates disease. 
Id. at 477 (citing Zurich, 514 N.E.2d 
at 156). Without symptoms, they 
argued, it would be impossible to 
determine with accuracy exactly when 
a disease began. Therefore, it should 
follow that a disease would have to be 
diagnosed by its symptoms before it 
could constitute a " bodily injury." Id. 
This argument, however, did not sway 
the Illinois court which concluded that 
once asbestos fibers are inhaled, bodily 
injury occurs, and nothing within the 
insurance policy requires diagnosis 
nor does it require identification of 
that injury within the policy period. 
Simply stated, only the injury must 
take place within the policy coverage, 
not the subsequently-manifested dis-
ease. Id. 
Extending this analysis, the Mary-
land Court of Appeals noted that mere 
exposure to asbestos without injury 
does not trigger coverage. Id. at 478. 
However, upon the diagnosis of a 
disease, the courts will look back to 
the time of initial exposure to deter-
mine when the bodily injury occurred. 
Id. 
In this writer's opinion, an inter-
esting situation would have arisen if a 
person had been diagnosed under the 
insured's valid policy. When looking 
retroactively to the point of bodily 
injury, however, the initial inhalation 
of asbestos predated the policy cover-
age. It is unclear whether coverage 
would be allowed even if the insured 
product clearly aggravated an other-
wise pre-existing asbestos-related mild 
lung condition. Technically, no in-
jury actually" occurred" as defined by 
the Maryland Casualty policy. Also, 
if the process to develop lung disease 
from asbestos is not immediate, it 
would appear to be very difficult, if 
not impossible, to decipher which 
inhalation precipitated the disease, i.e., 
was it the asbestos in his own home, a 
neighbors home, at work, etc. It would 
seem that unless actual initial causa-
tion could be shown, coverage would 
not be triggered. 
The significance of Mitchell v. 
Maryland Casualty Co. rests with its 
possible application to other disease 
related cases where exposure to a 
condition is relevant, such as AIDS or 
Hepatitis B in hospitals and other 
facilities dealing with blood. For 
now, Maryland's stance on asbestos-
related insurance coverage is to be 
determined from the moment of initial 
exposure, so long as a disease mani-
fests itself as a result. This is a policy 
which protects both consumers and 
installers from unknown dangers which 
we may not yet have the technology to 
detect. It places the burden tempo-
rarily upon insurance companies who 
can best afford the risk of using new 
materials and devices, and in turn, 
through their own influence, can pres-
sure the manufacturers to work harder 
to safeguard the public. 
- Kenneth Goldsmith 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.: 
FIRST AMENDMENT DOES 
NOT PROIDBIT AN INFOR-
MANT FROM RECOVERING 
DAMAGES UNDER STATE'S 
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL LAW 
FOR NEWSPAPER'S BREACH 
OF PROMISE OF CONFIDENTI-
ALITY. 
In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 
111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991), the United 
States Supreme Court held that the 
First Amendment does not prohibit an 
informant from recovering damages 
under a state's generally applicable 
promissory estoppel law for a 
newspaper's breach of a promise of 
confidentiality given in exchange for 
information. The Court based its 
decision on the theory that laws of 
